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This article analyzes competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent and
a new entrant. Networks compete in non-linear tari⁄s and may charge di⁄erent prices for
on-net and o⁄-net calls. Departing from cost-based access pricing allows the incumbent
to foreclose the market in a pro￿table way. If the incumbent bene￿ts from customer
inertia, then it has an incentive to insist in the highest possible access markup even if
access charges are reciprocal and even in the absence of actual switching costs. If instead
the entrant bene￿ts from customer activism, then foreclosure is pro￿table only when
switching costs are large enough.1 Introduction
Telecommunication networks need access to rivals￿customers in order to provide uni-
versal connectivity. This need for interconnection requires cooperation among network
operators, who must agree on access conditions and, in particular, on termination charges
(also called access charges). These wholesale arrangements a⁄ect the operators￿cost of
o⁄-net calls and the revenues accruing from providing termination services, and thus have
an impact on retail competition among the operators. This raises two concerns. The ￿rst
is that cooperation over interconnection may be used to soften downstream competition;
the second is that established network operators may use access charges to foreclose the
market.
The former issue was ￿rst addressed by Armstrong (1998) and La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole
(1998a), who show that high access charges indeed undermine retail competition when
networks compete in linear prices and do not price discriminate on the basis of where
the call terminates.1 La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show however that access charges
lose their collusive power when networks compete in other dimensions, as is the case of
two-part tari⁄s, due to a waterbed e⁄ect.2 An increase in the access charge in￿ ates usage
prices, but this makes it more attractive to build market share, which results in ￿ercer
competition for subscribers and lower ￿xed fees: networks can actually ￿nd it worthwhile
to spend the full revenue from interconnection fees to build market share, so that termi-
nation charges no longer a⁄ect equilibrium pro￿ts. This pro￿t-neutrality result has since
been further studied and shown to depend on three assumptions: full participation, no
termination-based price discrimination and network symmetry.3 L￿pez (2008) moreover
extends the previous static analyses and shows that, in a two-stage model, even symmet-
ric networks with full consumer participation can use (future) reciprocal access charges
to soften competition.4
1High termination charges raise on average the marginal cost of calls, which encourages operators to
maintain high prices.
2The term "waterbed e⁄ect" was ￿rst coined by Prof. Paul Geroski during the investigation of the
impact of ￿xed-to-mobile termination charges on retail prices. See also Genakos and Valletti (2011).
3For a review of this literature, see Armstrong (2002), Vogelsang (2003), and Peitz et al (2004).
4Since departing from cost-based termination charges adversely a⁄ects larger networks, this in turn
reduces networks￿incentives to build market shares.
1In the case of termination-based price discrimination, Gans and King (2001), building
on La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b), show that a (reciprocal) access charge below cost
reduces competition. The intuition is that o⁄-net calls being then cheaper than on-net
calls, customers favour smaller networks; as a result, networks bid less aggressively for
market share, which raises the equilibrium pro￿ts. However, in practice regulators are
usually concerned that access charges are too high rather than too low, particularly for
mobile operators. As stressed by Armstrong and Wright (2009), this may stem from the
fact that ￿wholesale arbitrage￿limits mobile operators￿ability to maintain high ￿xed-to-
mobile (FTM) charges5 alongside low mobile-to-mobile (MTM) charges, since ￿xed-line
networks could ￿transit￿their calls via another mobile operator in order to bene￿t from
a lower MTM charge.6 Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2010), Hoernig, Inderst and
Valletti (2010), and Hurkens and L￿pez (2011) provide alternative explanations for why
￿rms may prefer above-cost access charges.
The second traditional concern is that cooperation might be insu¢ cient. This issue
usually arises in markets where large incumbent operators face competition from smaller
rivals, and may be tempted to degrade connectivity or use access charges to foreclose the
market. Indeed, small mobile operators often complain that a high termination charge
hurts their ability to compete in an e⁄ective way with large networks. Two arguments
are normally used to motivate this concern. The ￿rst is a supply-side argument, whereby
small operators face higher long-run incremental costs than larger operators due to scale
economies.7 European national regulatory agencies (NRAs) have for example relied on
this argument to justify the adoption of asymmetric termination rates.8
5Historically, ￿xed and mobile operators were not really competing against each other, and thus a tra-
ditional "one-way access" analysis applied. Termination charges between those two types of networks are
moreover usually asymmetric, di⁄erent termination costs and regulatory constraints leading to relatively
low charges for mobile-to-￿xed calls and substantially higher charges for ￿xed-to-mobile calls.
6If mobile operators must adopt the same termination charge for FTM and MTM calls, this uniform
charge may then be above cost if the waterbed e⁄ect on FTM is limited or if operators set their own
charges unilaterally.
7It is also argued that cost di⁄erences may be exacerbated by staggered entry dates, unequal access
to spectrum and (lack of) integration between ￿xed and mobile services.
8See for example the decision of the Belgian NRA (DØcision du Conseil de l￿ IBPT) of 11 August
2006, the Decision 2007-0810 of October 4 2007 by the French NRA (ARCEP), the decision (Delibera
3/06/CONS) adopted by the Italian NRA (AGCOM) in January 2006 or the three decisions adopted by
the Spanish NRA (CMT) on 28 September 2006 (Decisions AEM 2006/724, AEM 2006/725 and AEM
2006/726). See also the review of mobile call termination by the regulator and competition authority for
2The second argument, which is the focus of this paper, is the presence of demand-
side network e⁄ects resulting from termination-based price discrimination. If for example
the termination charge is above cost, then prices will be lower for on-net calls; as a
result, customers favour larger networks, in which a higher proportion of calls remain
on-net. Some European NRAs have also relied on this demand-side argument to call for
asymmetric termination charges. For example, in its Decision of October 2007, the French
regulator stressed the presence of network e⁄ects due to o⁄-net/on-net tari⁄ di⁄erentials
that impede smaller networks￿ability to compete e⁄ectively.9 Similarly, in its Decision
of September 2006,10 the Spanish regulator argued that network e⁄ects can place smaller
networks at a disadvantage, and that higher access charges can increase the size of such
network e⁄ects. In the Common Position adopted on February 2008,11 while the European
regulators argue in favour of symmetric access charges, they also express the concern
that, because of network e⁄ects, "an on-net/o⁄-net retail price di⁄erential, together with
signi￿cantly above-cost mobile termination rates, can, in certain circumstances, tone
down competition to the bene￿t of larger networks".12
To explore this issue, we analyze the competition between two asymmetric networks,
an incumbent and a new entrant. Customers are initially attached to the incumbent
network and incur switching costs if moving to the other network. Thus, as in Klemperer
(1987), to build market share the entrant must bid more aggressively for customers than
the incumbent, which therefore enjoys greater market power. In particular, the incumbent
operator can keep monopolizing the market when switching costs are large enough; as we
will see, when switching costs are not that large, departing from cost-based termination
charges can help the incumbent operator maintain its monopoly position and pro￿t.
We ￿rst consider the case where networks not only compete in subscription fees and
the UK communications industries (OFCOM Mobile Call Termination Statement, 27 March 2007).
9See section 4.2.2 of ARCEP Decision 2007-0810 of October 4 2007.
10Decision AEM 2006/726, p. 13, 14 and 33.
11See "ERG￿ s Common Position on symmetry of ￿xed call termination rates and symmetry of mobile
call termination rates", adopted by the ERG-Plenary on 28th February 2008, p. 96-102. Available at
http://www.erg.eu.int/.
12The Common Position also stresses that these network e⁄ects can be exacerbated via incoming calls:
as a high o⁄-net price reduces the amount of o⁄-net calls, it also lowers the value of belonging to the
smaller network since less people will then call the customers of that network.
3in usage prices, but can moreover charge di⁄erent prices for on-net and o⁄-net calls. Such
on-net pricing creates price-mediated network e⁄ects and, as a result, the incumbent
operator can indeed keep the entrant out of the market and still charge monopoly prices
by setting a large enough mark-up (or subsidy) on the access charge, even if access charges
are reciprocal. If the incumbent operator bene￿ts from "customer inertia",13 then it has
actually an incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access mark-up, so as
to foreclose the market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power. Customer inertia
thus provides a form of "virtual" switching costs which, combined with high termination
charges, is a good substitute for "real" switching costs: in the presence of customer inertia,
the incumbent operator can corner the market and earn the monopoly pro￿t even in the
absence of any real switching costs. A second ￿nding is that a large termination subsidy
may also yield the same outcome; this means that in some cases "bill and keep" may
allow the incumbent operator to foreclose the market; however feasibility constraints
may limit subsidies, which may moreover trigger various types of arbitrage. The scope
for foreclosure is more limited when the entrant bene￿ts from "customer activism";14
while the incumbent operator may still try to prevent entry, too high an access charge
would allow the entrant to overtake it. The incumbent operator may then prefer to set
an above- or below-cost access charge, and foreclosure strategies are pro￿table only when
switching costs are su¢ ciently large.
Our analysis also extends the insight of Gans and King (2001) and shows that, as long
as the two networks share the market, a small access subsidy generates higher equilibrium
pro￿ts (for both networks) than any positive access mark-up. Yet, it does not follow
that both networks will agree to subsidizing access, since a large enough access mark-
up may instead allow the incumbent operator to corner the market, and higher levels
might moreover allow the incumbent operator to earn the full monopoly pro￿t. Another
key ￿nding is that limiting entry without deterring it entirely is never pro￿table. This
13Since on-net pricing generates club e⁄ects, consumers face coordination problems and there may
exist multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices. We will refer to "customer inertia" when, in
case of multiple responses, consumers adopt the response that is most favourable to the incumbent.
14We will refer to "customer activism" when, by contrast to the case of customer inertia, in case of
multiple responses consumers adopt the response that is most favourable to the entrant.
4result has clear implications for policy. Finally, we show that termination-based price
discrimination is a key factor in foreclosing competition. Indeed, absent on-net pricing,
foreclosure strategies are never pro￿table ￿and moreover no longer feasible in a receiver-
pays regime.
There are only few insights from the academic literature on the impact of mobile oper-
ators￿termination rates on entry or predation. Calzada and Valletti (2008) extend Gans
and King￿ s analysis to a (symmetric) multi-￿rm industry; they stress that incumbent op-
erators may favour above-cost termination charges when new operators face entry costs:
for any given number of ￿rms, increasing the charge above cost decreases the equilibrium
pro￿ts but, by the same token, limits the number of entrants; overall, this allows incum-
bent operators to increase their own pro￿ts. This however requires incumbent operators
to commit not to modify the termination charge if entry occurs; otherwise, entrants would
anticipate that incumbent operators have incentives to decrease the termination charge
once entry occurs, and an above-cost termination charge no longer deters entry. In our
model, we allow instead the entrant to remain "in the market" even if it is not active;
thus, our foreclosure results do not depend on such commitment assumption. Hoernig
(2007) analyzes predatory pricing in the presence of call externalities (i.e., taking into ac-
count the utility of receiving calls) and termination-based price discrimination, for given
termination charges. He shows that call externalities give the incumbent operator an
incentive to increase its o⁄-net price in order to make a smaller rival less attractive (as it
will receive fewer or shorter calls), and this incentive is even higher when the incumbent
operator engages in predatory pricing and seeks to reduce its rival￿ s pro￿t. Calzada and
Valletti (2008), and Hoernig (2007) thus study how incumbent operators can reduce ri-
vals￿pro￿tability in order to limit entry, at the expense of a (possibly temporary) loss in
their own pro￿t. In contrast, we study how the incumbent operator can manipulate the
termination charge (even when it is reciprocal) to increase its own pro￿t at the expense
of the entrant.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 analyses
retail competition for a given, reciprocal, access charge. It ￿rst characterizes shared-
5market equilibria and extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks;
it then studies under what conditions one network may corner the market. Section
4 draws the implications for the determination of the access charge and shows that,
despite Gans and King￿ s insight, an incumbent network may favour a high access charge
in order to foreclose the market. Section 5 analyses the case of no termination-based
price discrimination under both the caller-pays and the receiver-pays regime. Section 6
concludes.
2 The model
There are two networks: an incumbent, I, and an entrant, E. Both networks have the
same cost structure. It costs f to connect a customer, and each call costs c ￿ cO + cT,
where cO and cT respectively denote the costs borne by the originating and terminating
networks. To terminate an o⁄-net call, the originating network must pay a reciprocal
access charge a to the terminating network. The access mark-up is thus equal to:
m ￿ a ￿ cT.
Networks o⁄er substitutable services but are di⁄erentiated ￿ la Hotelling. Consumers
are uniformly distributed on the segment [0;1], whereas the two networks are located at
the two ends of this segment. Consumers￿tastes are represented by their position on the
segment and taken into account through a "transportation" cost t > 0, which re￿ ects
their disutility from not enjoying their ideal type of service. For a given volume of calls
q, a consumer located at x and joining network i = I;E located at xi 2 f0;1g obtains a
gross utility given by:
u(q) ￿ tjx ￿ xij,
where u(q) denotes the variable gross surplus, with u0 > 0 > u00 and u0 (0) < +1.
Throughout the paper, we will assume that u(0), the ￿xed surplus derived from being
connected to either network, is large enough to ensure full participation.15 Finally, we
15This surplus may for example re￿ ect the bene￿ts from complementary services such as SMS, data
6assume that consumers switching to E￿ s network incur a cost s > 0.
Each network i = I;E o⁄ers a three-part tari⁄:
Ti(q; ^ q) = Fi + piq + ^ pi^ q,
where Fi is the ￿xed subscription fee and pi and ^ pi respectively denote the on-net and
o⁄-net usage prices:
Let ￿i denote network i￿ s market share. Assuming a balanced calling pattern,16 the
net surplus o⁄ered by network i is (for i 6= j = I;E):
wi = ￿iv(pi) + ￿jv(^ pi) ￿ Fi, (1)
where
v(p) ￿ max
q u(q) ￿ pq
denotes the consumer surplus for a price p.
In a ￿rst step, we will take as given the reciprocal termination charge and study the
subsequent competition game where the networks set simultaneously their retail tari⁄s
(subscription fees and usage prices), and then consumers choose which network to sub-
scribe to and how much to call. In a second step we discuss the determination of the
termination charge. Before that, we characterize the consumer response to networks￿
prices and provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium prices.
Marginal cost pricing. As usual, networks ￿nd it optimal to adopt cost-based
usage prices. Network i￿ s pro￿t is equal to:
￿i ￿ ￿i [￿i(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + ￿j(^ pi ￿ c ￿ m)q(^ pi) + Fi ￿ f] + ￿i￿jmq(^ pj). (2)
Adjusting Fi so as to maintain net surpluses wI and wE and thus market shares constant,17
services or the ability of receiving calls, which are not explicitly modeled here. See also the discussion in
footnotes (21) and (30).
16This assumption implies that the proportion of calls originating on a given network and completed
on the same or the other network re￿ ects networks￿market shares.
17As already noted, on-net pricing can generate multiple consumer responses to a given set of prices.
7then leads network i to set its prices pi and ^ pi so as to maximize
￿i f￿i [(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + v(pi)] + ￿j [(^ pi ￿ c ￿ m)q(^ pi) + v(^ pi)] ￿ wi ￿ fg + ￿i￿jmq(^ pj),
which yields marginal-cost pricing:
pi = c; ^ pi = c + m.
Thus, both networks always charge usage prices that re￿ ect the perceived cost of calls:
the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the access mark-up m for o⁄-net calls. As
a result, while each network i must pay ￿i￿jmq(^ pi) to its rival, there is no net intercon-
nection payment; since both networks charge the same o⁄-net price (^ pi = ^ pj = c + m),
neither the incumbent nor the entrant has a net out￿ ow of calls: ￿i￿jm(q(^ pj)￿q(^ pi)) = 0,
whatever the networks￿market shares.
Network Externalities and market shares. Since the o⁄-net price, c + m ,
increases with the access mark-up, departing from cost-based termination charges gener-
ates tari⁄-mediated network externalities. For example, if the access mark-up is positive,
prices are higher for o⁄-net calls (c + m > c) and the subscribers of a given network
are thus better o⁄, the more customers join that network. As a result, there may exist
multiple consumer responses to given subscription fees FI and FE.
If consumers anticipate market shares ￿ ￿I and ￿ ￿E = 1 ￿ ￿ ￿I, then they expect a net
surplus
wi = ￿ ￿iv(c) + ￿ ￿jv(c + m) ￿ Fi. (3)
from subscribing to network i, for i 6= j = I;E. A consumer located at a distance
x 2 [0;1] from network I is therefore willing to stay with that network when wI ￿ tx ￿
wE￿t(1￿x)￿s and prefers to switch otherwise. In a shared-market outcome, the actual
We assume here that changing tari⁄s so as to keep net surpluses constant does not trigger consumers to
switch to alternative responses, if they exist.
8consumer response, ^ ￿i, as a function of consumers￿expectation ￿ ￿i, is therefore given by
^ ￿i(￿ ￿i) =
1
2










(v(c) ￿ v(c + m)); (4)
where ￿I ￿ 1; ￿E ￿ ￿1, and ￿ ￿ 1=2t measures the substitutability between the two








￿ (m) ￿ t ￿ [v(c) ￿ v(c + m)]
summarize the balance between product di⁄erentiation, measured by t, and the network
externalities stemming from on-net pricing, measured by v (c) ￿ v (c + m).
We will assume that, having observed the prices, consumers have self-ful￿lling expec-
tations, implying that market shares constitute a ￿xed point of the "reaction to anticipa-
tions", maxf0;minf1; ^ ￿(:)gg).18 When m is small, the relative preferences over the two
networks prevail:
￿ (m) > 0; (5)
in which case the slope d^ ￿i=d￿ ￿i is lower than 1 (and is even negative for m < 0, as
network externalities then yield a bonus for the smaller network), implying that there
exists a unique consumer response to any given ￿xed fees (see Figure 1). The ￿xed point
￿ ￿i = ^ ￿i(￿ ￿i), which from (4) is characterized by




FE ￿ FI + s
2￿(m)
; (6)
18We thus assume here that expectations respond to pricing deviations. Hurkens and L￿pez (2011)
consider instead the case of passive self-ful￿lling equilibrium expectations, which do not respond to
deviations. They ￿nd that this attenuates the so-called waterbed e⁄ect (the extent to which higher
termination revenues are passed on to consumers through lower subscription fees), and even annuls it in
case of duopoly.
9determines the networks￿market shares ￿I and ￿E when it lies in (0;1) (Figure 1.A).
When instead it exceeds 1 (so that ^ ￿i(1) ￿ 1), network i corners the market (Figure
1.B); ￿nally, when it is negative (so that ^ ￿i(0) ￿ 0), the other network corners the
market (Figure 1.C).
i a ˆ
i a i a i a
    A. 1 0 < < i a       B. 1 = i a             C. 0 = i a
i a ˆ i a ˆ
Figure 1: Unique and stable consumer response: v(c) ￿ v(c + m) < t:
As m increases, o⁄-net calls become more expensive, which generates greater network
externalities in favor of the larger network; as a result, ￿(m) decreases and may even
become negative for m large enough. There may then exist multiple consumer responses,
as illustrated in Figure 2.A, where two cornered-market outcomes co-exist with a shared-
market one: o⁄-net calls being much more expensive than on-net calls, customers prefer
to join the larger network, regardless of its other characteristics; the network externalities
from on-net pricing prevail over the relative preferences for the two operators, and either
network can then corner the market.
10i a ˆ
i a
A. 1 , 0 = = i i a a
( ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ i a  is unstable)
       B. 1 = i a               C. 0 = i a
i a ˆ i a ˆ
i a i a
Figure 2: Cornered-market stable consumer responses: v(c) ￿ v(c + m) > t.
The shared-market outcome is moreover unstable: a small increase in the market
share of any network triggers a cumulative process in favour of that network, and this
process converges towards that network cornering the market.19 In contrast, the two
cornered-market outcomes are stable. In particular, starting from a situation where all
consumers are with the incumbent, a few customers making a "mistake" and switching
to the entrant would not trigger any snowballing in favour of the entrant; the customers
would thus regret their mistake and wish to have stayed with the incumbent. Since
customer inertia may favour the incumbent, in the case of multiple consumer responses
it may be reasonable to assume that the stable outcome where consumers stick to the
incumbent network is the most plausible outcome. Yet, throughout the paper, we will
also take into consideration the possibility of alternative consumer responses and study
under what conditions the incumbent can make sure to keep the rival out of the market.
3 Price competition
We now characterize the equilibrium ￿xed fees, given the consumer response determined
in the previous section.
19Notice that ￿(m) > 0 amounts to 1 ￿ 2￿(v(c) ￿ v(c + m)) > 0, which is the stability condition
introduced in La⁄ont, Rey and Tirole (1998b, p. 52).
11Shared-market equilibria
In the light of the above analysis, a price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market
outcome can exist only when (5) holds, in which case the consumer response is moreover
always unique. We denote by ￿i (FI;FE) the corresponding market share of network
i = I;E. Since usage prices re￿ ect costs, network i￿ s pro￿t can be written as (for
i 6= j = I;E):
￿i = ￿i (FI;FE)[Fi ￿ f + ￿j (FI;FE)mq(c + m)]. (7)
Best responses. Given the rival￿ s fee Fj, we can use the market share de￿nition (6)
to express Fi and ￿i as a function of ￿i:
Fi = Fj + ￿ (m) + ￿is ￿ 2￿ (m)￿i,
￿i(￿i) = ￿i [Fj + ￿(m) + ￿is ￿ f + mq(c + m) ￿ 2’(m)￿i], (8)
where




and ￿I = ￿￿E = 1. The ￿rst-order derivative is
d￿i
d￿i
= Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f ￿ 4’(m)￿i, (9)
while the second-order derivative is negative if and only if:
’(m) > 0. (10)
When this second-order condition holds, we have:
￿ if Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f ￿ 0, network i￿ s best response is to leave
the market to its rival (i.e., ￿i = 0), and any F r
i (Fj) ￿ Fj + ￿is + ￿(m) is thus a
best-response to Fj (see the dashed areas in Figure 3);
￿ if Fj +￿(m)+mq(c+m)+￿is￿f ￿ 4’(m), network i￿ s best response is to corner
12the market (￿i = 1), and thus F r
i (Fj) = Fj + ￿is ￿ ￿(m) (45￿ lines in Figure 3),
￿ if 4’(m) > Fj +￿(m)+mq(c+m)+￿is￿f > 0, network i￿ s best response entails
a shared-market outcome, ￿i 2 (0;1):
￿i =
Fj + ￿(m) + mq(c + m) + ￿is ￿ f
4’(m)
, (11)




(￿(m) + mq(c + m))(Fj + ￿is) + ￿(m)(f + ￿(m))
2’(m)
,
where the denominator is positive as long as the second-order condition holds.
Equilibrium. Solving for the ￿rst-order conditions yields:
Fi = f + ￿(m) +




  (m) ￿ ￿ (m) +
2
3
mq (c + m).
Substituting (12) into (6), equilibrium market shares are given by









It is easy to check that   (m) > 0 in any candidate shared-market equilibrium,20 which
implies that the market share ￿I exceeds 1=2 and increases with s. Therefore, it cor-
responds indeed to a shared-market equilibrium (i.e., ￿i < 1) when and only when s is
small enough, namely, when




20When subscription fees are (weak) strategic complements (@Fi=@Fj ￿ 0, or ￿(m)+mq(c+m) ￿ 0),
(5) implies   (m) > 0, since 3 (m) = 2(￿(m) + mq(c + m)) + ￿(m) > 0; when subscription fees are
instead strategic substitutes (@Fi=@Fj < 0, or ￿ (m) + mq (m) < 0), the candidate equilibrium is stable



























Figure 3: Shared-market equilibria. aI = f ￿ mq(c + m), bI = f + 2￿(m) + mq(c + m),
aE = f + s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c + m), bE = f + s + 3￿(m) + mq(c + m).
When m ￿ 0, (5) implies (10) and 0 < @Fi=@Fj < 1. When instead m < 0, (5) is
always satis￿ed and subscription fees remain strategic complements (i.e., @Fi=@Fj > 0) as
long as ￿(m)+mq(c+m) > 0, in which case (10) also holds and @Fi=@Fj < 1. Therefore,
in those two situations, whenever the shared-market condition (14) holds there exists a
unique price equilibrium, as illustrated by Figure 3.A; this equilibrium involves a shared
market characterized by (12), strategic complementarity and stability. If instead m < 0
and ￿(m) + mq(c + m) < 0, subscription fees are strategic substitutes. However, the
shared-market condition (14) then implies (10) and @Fi=@Fj > ￿1; therefore, the price
equilibrium is again unique and stable, as illustrated by Figure 3.B, and involves again
a shared market characterized by (12). In all cases, (5) moreover implies that consumer
responses to prices yield a stable market outcome. Thus, we have:
Proposition 1 A stable price equilibrium yielding a stable shared-market outcome exists,
in which case it is the unique price equilibrium, if and only if (5) and (14) hold.
Proposition 1 shows that a stable shared-market equilibrium exists when either the
termination charge or the substitutability of the two networks is not too high (condition
(5)), and switching costs are moreover moderate (condition (14)). For example, for cost-
based access charges (m = 0), such an equilibrium exists when s < 3t.21 When this
21As mentioned earlier, the utility derived from being connected to either network is suppose to be
14condition is satis￿ed, a shared-market equilibrium also exists (and is then the unique
equilibrium) when the termination mark-up is positive, as long as (5) and (14) remain
satis￿ed.
Comparative statics. We now study the impact of the access charge on shared-
market equilibrium pro￿ts. Gans and King (2001) show that symmetric networks prefer
access charges below marginal costs. Intuitively, when m is positive, o⁄-net calls are
priced above on-net calls, so consumers prefer to join larger networks, all else being
equal. Consequently, networks bid more aggressively for marginal customers. Networks
prefer instead to soften competition by setting the access charge below cost. The next
proposition con￿rms that, as long as the two networks share the market, price competition
is softened when m decreases below zero, independently of networks￿sizes.
Proposition 2 In the range of termination charges yielding a shared-market equilibrium:
￿ (i) both networks￿equilibrium pro￿ts are higher for a cost-based termination charge
(m = 0) than for any positive termination mark-up (m > 0);
￿ (ii) there exists a termination subsidy (m < 0) that gives both networks even greater
pro￿ts.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks. It how-
ever only applies to termination markups that are small enough to yield a shared-market
equilibrium. As we will see, networks may actually favour more extreme termination
markups that allow them to corner the market and charge high prices.22
large enough to ensure full participation. Under cost-based access charges, the marginal consumer￿net
utility is equal to:




Therefore, a su¢ cient condition for full participation is v (c) > f +3t, since then the marginal consumer
obtains a positive net utility whenever a shared-market equilibrium exists, i.e., whenever s < 3t.
22The same comment applies to the case of symmetric operators considered by Gans and King (which
corresponds here to s = 0). While they show that networks￿symmetric shared-market equilibrium
pro￿ts are maximal for a negative mark-up, more extreme mark-ups (including positive ones) may induce
cornered-market equilibria that generate greater industry pro￿ts.
15Cornered-market equilibria
We now study under what conditions a network operator can corner the market.
Suppose ￿rst that (5) still holds, ensuring that there is a unique consumer response
to subscription fees. From the above analysis, a cornered-market equilibrium can then
exist only when condition (14) fails to hold.
In a candidate equilibrium where network i corners the market, the consumers located
at the other end of the segment must prefer to stick to i￿ s network; that is, for i 6= j = I;E:
v (c) ￿ t ￿ Fi ￿ v (c + m) ￿ ￿is ￿ Fj, or: Fi ￿ Fj ￿ ￿ (m) + ￿is. Furthermore, if this
inequality holds strictly then i can increase its subscription fee and still corner the market.
Therefore, a necessary equilibrium condition is:
Fi = Fj ￿ ￿ (m) + ￿is. (15)
In addition: (i) network i should not prefer to charge a higher fee and increase its margin
at the expense of its market share; and (ii) its rival should not be able to attract consumers
and make positive pro￿ts. The precise interpretation of these two conditions depends on
the concavity of the pro￿t functions.
Concave pro￿ts. When (10) also holds, each operator￿ s pro￿t is globally concave
with respect to its own price; the relevant deviations thus involve marginal price changes
leading to a shared-market outcome. A candidate equilibrium satisfying (15) is therefore
indeed an equilibrium if and only if:
￿ Network i does not gain from a marginal increase in its fee;23 given the previous
analysis of best responses, this amounts to Fj + ￿(m) + ￿is ￿ f + mq(c + m) ￿
4(￿(m) + mq(c + m)=2), or:
Fj ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ ￿is, (16)
23Note that this condition ensures that i obtains a non-negative pro￿t ￿otherwise, a small increase
in Fi would reduce its loss. Indeed, (15) and (16) imply Fi > f when the second-order condition (10)
holds.
16￿ The rival network j does not gain from a marginal reduction in its fee or, equiv-
alently, cannot make a positive pro￿t by attracting its closest consumers; this
amounts to:
Fj ￿ f ￿ mq (c + m). (17)
Network j￿ s fee must therefore lie in the range
f ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ Fj ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ ￿is, (18)
which is feasible only when




For the incumbent (i = I, for which ￿I = 1), this condition is satis￿ed whenever (14)
fails to hold. Any pair of subscription fees (FI;FE) satisfying
FI = FE ￿ ￿ (m) + s (20)
and
f ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ FE ￿ f + 3￿ (m) + mq (c + m) ￿ s (21)
then constitutes a price equilibrium where I corners the market. Among those equilibria,
only one does not rely on weakly dominated strategies for E, and is therefore trembling-
hand perfect: this is the one where
FE = f ￿ mq (c + m);FI = f + s ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ mq (c + m). (22)
By contrast, E can corner the market only if
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Figure 4: Cornered-market equilibria. aI = f ￿mq(c+m), bI = f +2￿(m)+mq(c+m),
aE = f+s￿￿(m)￿mq(c+m), bE = f+s+3￿(m)+mq(c+m); cI = f￿s￿￿(m)￿mq(c+m),
dI = f ￿ s + 3￿(m) + mq(c + m), cE = f ￿ mq(c + m), dE = f + 2￿(m) + mq(c + m).
positive under (5)); however, the left-hand side may become negative and possibly lower
than ￿s=3 when m is largely negative, in which case there can be a continuum of equilibria
in which E corners the market by charging
FE = FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s, (24)
including a unique trembling-hand perfect equilibrium where I sets FI = f ￿mq (c + m)
and E thus charges FE = f ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ mq (c + m) ￿ s(> f).
Note ￿nally that, since (19) is more demanding for E than for I, I can corner the
market whenever E can do so (that is, both cornered market equilibria exist whenever E
can corner the market).24 Figure 4 illustrates this case.
Convex pro￿ts. When (10) fails to hold, each operator￿ s pro￿t is convex with respect
24As usual with network e⁄ects, di⁄erent expectations yield multiple consumer responses, which in
turn may sustain multiple equilibria. The network e⁄ect arises here from on-net pricing rather than
traditional club e⁄ects. In a di⁄erent context, Matutes and Vives (1996) show that di⁄erent expectations
about the success of banks and coordination problems among depositors can result in multiple shared-
and cornered-market equilibria (and even in a no-banking equilibrium).
18to its own subscription fee. The relevant strategies then consist in either cornering the
market or leaving it to the rival. Thus, in a candidate equilibrium where I corners the
market, it must be the case that:
￿ I does not gain from "opting out", i.e., it should obtain a non-negative pro￿t:
FI ￿ f.
￿ E does not gain from lowering its subscription fee so as to corner the market, i.e.,



















































Figure 5: A) Only the incumbent corners the market: s > ￿(m): B) The incumbent or
the entrant corners the market: s < ￿(m).
It follows that I￿ s equilibrium price must satisfy:
f + ￿ (m) + s ￿ FI ￿ f, (25)
where the left-hand side is indeed always higher than the right-hand side under (5). Any
combination of fees satisfying (20) and (25) constitutes an equilibrium in which I corners
the market.
We can similarly study under what conditions E can corner the market: condition
(24) must hold, E must obtain a non-negative pro￿t (i.e., FE ￿ f) and I should not be
19able to make a pro￿t by cornering the market, i.e.: FI = FE ￿ ￿ (m) + s ￿ f. Thus, in
this equilibrium E￿ s equilibrium fee satis￿es:
f + ￿(m) ￿ s ￿ FE ￿ f,
and such an equilibrium thus exists if and only if s ￿ ￿ (m). It follows that when E
corners the market, I￿ s equilibrium price lies in the range [f + ￿(m) + s;f + 2￿(m)].
Figure 5 summarizes this analysis. When s > ￿ (m), only I can corner the market
and it can achieve that while charging any price between f and f + ￿ (m) + s. When
instead s ￿ ￿ (m), however, E may also corner the market.
Multiple consumer responses. Last, we turn to the case where (5) does not hold
(i.e. ￿ (m) ￿ 0), in which case there is never a stable shared-market consumer allocation,
and there may be multiple cornered-market outcomes:
￿ when
FE > FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s, (26)
there is a unique consumer response, in which I corners the market (b ￿i(0) > 0,
Figure 2.B);
￿ when instead
FI ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ s ￿ FE ￿ FI + ￿ (m) ￿ s, (27)
there are two stable consumer responses, in which either I or E corners the market
(b ￿i(0) < 0 and b ￿i(1) > 1, Figure 2.A);25
￿ ￿nally, when
FE < FI + ￿ (m) ￿ s, (28)
there is again a unique consumer response, in which E corners the market (b ￿i(1) <
1, Figure 2.C).
25As mentioned, we discard the third consumer response in which the two networks share the market,
as it is unstable.
20Obviously, a network can corner the market more easily when consumers favour that
network in case of multiple responses to prices.
Suppose ￿rst that customer inertia, say, systematically favours the incumbent in the
"middle" case corresponding to (27). Then I wins the whole market as long as FI ￿FE ￿
s￿￿ (m), otherwise E wins the market. Since s￿￿ (m) > 0, I bene￿ts from a competitive
advantage in this Bertrand competition for the market and therefore corners the market
in equilibrium. Moreover, ignoring weakly dominated strategies for E, the equilibrium
is unique and such that FE = f and FI = f + s ￿ ￿ (m), giving I a positive pro￿t,
￿I = s ￿ ￿(m), which moreover increases with m.26
Suppose now that customer activism, say, is instead favourable to the entrant, i.e.,
consumers stick to E in case of multiple consumer responses. Then I wins the market
only when FI ￿ FE ￿ s + ￿ (m); therefore:
￿ When the switching cost is large enough, namely
s ￿ ￿￿(m),
then I still enjoys a competitive advantage and corners again the market in equilib-
rium; ignoring weakly dominated strategies, in equilibrium E sells at cost (FE = f)
and I obtains a pro￿t, ￿I = s + ￿(m)(< s), which decreases with m.
￿ When instead the switching cost is low (s < ￿￿ (m)), the tari⁄-mediated network
externalities dominate and customer activism gives a competitive advantage to E;
as a result, in all equilibria E corners the market.27
Recap. The above analysis can be summarized as follows. When m = 0, conditions
(5) and (10) hold; therefore, from the above analysis, E cannot corner the market (this
would require s < ￿3t, a contradiction), whereas I can corner the market only if the
switching cost is prohibitively high, namely: s ￿ 3t. When the switching cost is not
26If ￿(m) is su¢ ciently negative, I obtains the monopoly pro￿t.
27In the limit case where s = ￿￿ (m), both I and E can corner the market in equilibrium, but earn
zero pro￿t anyway.
21that high, I may still corner the market when the termination charge departs from cost;
however, E may then also corner the market. More precisely:
Proposition 3 Cornered-market equilibria exist in the following circumstances:
￿ Unique consumer response (￿ (m) > 0):
￿Concave pro￿ts (’(m) > 0): there exists an equilibrium in which I corners the
market when   (m) ￿ s=3; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners
the market when   (m) ￿ ￿s=3.
￿Convex pro￿ts (’(m) ￿ 0): there always exists an equilibrium in which I cor-
ners the market; there also exists an equilibrium in which E corners the market
when ￿ (m) ￿ s.
￿ Multiple consumer responses (￿ (m) ￿ 0):
￿Customer inertia favourable to the incumbent: there exists a unique equilib-
rium, in which I corners the market.
￿Customer activism favourable to the entrant: there generically exists a unique
equilibrium; in this equilibrium, I corners the market when ￿ (m) > ￿s,
whereas E corners the market when ￿ (m) < ￿s.
4 Strategic choice of the access charge
Under a cost-based termination charge (m = 0), consumer response to prices is always
unique and operators￿pro￿ts are moreover concave (since ’(0) = ￿ (0) = t > 0). Yet,
even in that case, E cannot obtain a positive market share if switching costs are too large
￿namely, if   (0) = t ￿ s=3. In what follows, we thus assume that s < 3t, and study
I￿ s strategic incentive to depart from cost-based termination charges in order to foreclose
the market and increase its pro￿t.28
28I can however bene￿t from raising m even when s ￿ t=3, as this weakens the competitive pressure
from its rival in the resulting cornered-market equilibrium (as long as (5) and (10) continue to hold).
22Foreclosure through high termination charges
Our extension of Gans and King￿ s insight shows that raising the termination charge
above cost degrades both operators￿pro￿ts as long as the market remains shared; our
equilibrium analysis shows further that this is the case as long as ￿ (m) > 0 and   (m) >
s=3, where, letting
￿ m ￿ u
0 (0) ￿ c;
denote the termination markup for which the demand for calls becomes zero, and
￿ ￿ v (c) ￿ v (1)
measure the scope for network externalities, ￿ (:) and   (:) decrease from t to t ￿ ￿ as
m goes from 0 to ￿ m (and remain constant afterwards). We can therefore distinguish two
broad cases:
Case 1 (small network externalities): ￿ < t. In that case, ￿(m) is always
positive (for any m), and both ’(m) and   (m) are also positive for m ￿ 0; therefore,
any positive termination mark-up leads to a unique equilibrium, in which either the two
networks share the market (if   (m) > s=3) or I corners the market (if   (m) ￿ s=3).
More precisely:
￿ if s < 3(t ￿ ￿),  (m) > s=3 for any m ￿ 0: thus, I cannot increase its pro￿t by
raising the termination charge above cost, as networks keep sharing the market;
￿ if instead s ￿ 3(t￿￿),   (m) ￿ s=3 for a high enough termination mark-up, namely,
for






in which case I corners the market and obtains
￿
C
I (m) ￿ s ￿ ￿ (m) ￿ mq (c + m); (29)





0 (c + m) > 0:
Foreclosing the market in this way is pro￿table for I when the maximum pro￿t that
it can obtain, ￿ ￿C
I ￿ ￿C
I (￿ m) = s ￿ t + ￿, exceeds the pro￿t that it could obtain by


















3t(> 3(t ￿ ￿)).
We thus have:
￿ for s ￿ ￿ s, it is never pro￿table for the incumbent to foreclose the market by raising
the termination charge above cost;
￿ for s > ￿ s,29 the combination of network externalities and switching costs makes it
instead pro￿table for I to foreclose the market in this way.
Case 2 (large network externalities): ￿ > t. Increasing the termination charge
above ^ m ￿ ￿￿1 (0) then ensures that consumers always prefer to be all on the same net-
work (￿(m) < 0); the pro￿tability of this foreclosure strategy however depends critically
on which network is more likely to win the market when there are multiple consumer
responses. For the sake of exposition, we will focus on two polar cases, where either cus-
tomer inertia systematically favours the incumbent, or customer activism systematically
favours the entrant.
Customer inertia. When I bene￿ts from customer inertia, it can keep E out and
better exploit its market power by raising further the termination charge above ^ m; I
still wins the market and can charge up to (the superscript CI standing for "customer
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I (m) = f + s ￿ ￿ (m),
which increases with m as long as demand remains positive:
dFCI
I
dm = q (c + m) ￿ 0.
Therefore, the incumbent has an incentive to set m as high as possible, in order to
extract consumer surplus without fearing any competitive pressure from the entrant. The
only limitations come from consumer demand: raising m above ￿ m does not increase I￿ s
pro￿t any further, as consumers stop calling (that is, dF CI
I =dm = 0 for m > ￿ m). Yet, if
the demand for calls is large enough, raising the termination charge allows I to eliminate
any competitive pressure from E and charge monopoly prices. For example, if consumers￿
surplus v (c) is large enough, a monopolist would maintain full participation30 and use
the subscription fee to extract the full value from the farthest consumer: F M = v (c)￿t.








f + s, would then allow I to achieve the monopoly pro￿t. Customer inertia can thus be
interpreted as a "virtual" switching cost, which can allow the incumbent to corner the
market and earn the monopoly pro￿t even in the absence of any real switching costs.
Customer activism. If instead customer activism favours the entrant in case of mul-
tiple consumer responses, then I never bene￿ts from increasing the termination charge
beyond ^ m: as shown above, E would then sell at cost (FE = f) and I would obtain a
pro￿t, ￿I = s+￿(m), which is lower than s and moreover decreases with m. Furthermore,
for m < ^ m, either the networks share the market (if (14) holds, that is, if m < ￿ m), or
I corners the market (if m ￿ ￿ m), in which case I￿ s pro￿t increases with m as long as
m ￿ ^ m; therefore, the best foreclosure strategy is to adopt m = ^ m, which yields a pro￿t
equal to
^ ￿I = s.
Foreclosing the market in this way is pro￿table if this pro￿t exceeds the pro￿t that can be
achieved by sharing the market for m = 0, ￿0




to s < ￿ sj￿=t = (2 ￿
p
3)3t.
30 This is the case whenever v (c) ￿ f + 2t.
25Foreclosure through large termination subsidies
Alternatively, I can try to foreclose the market by adopting a large subsidy (m ￿ 0). For
m < 0, the stability condition (5) always holds, implying that there is a unique, stable,
consumer response to prices (the issue of customer inertia or favoritism thus becomes
irrelevant). Moreover, ’(m) =   (m)￿mq (c + m)=6 ￿   (m), which implies that pro￿ts
are concave (’(m) > 0) whenever the shared market condition (  (m) > s=3) is satis￿ed.
For a su¢ ciently large subsidy, one may have   (m) ￿ s=3. However, as long as pro￿ts
remain concave, I￿ s pro￿t coincides again with ￿C
I (m) and thus decreases when the size
of the termination subsidy increases (in addition, E may as well corner the market if
  (m) ￿ ￿s=3). Yet, I may bene￿t from increasing further the size of the subsidy, so as
to make pro￿ts convex (i.e., ’(m) ￿ 0); there is an equilibrium in which I corners the
market and can charge up to F Conv




dm = ￿q (c + m) < 0. Hence there may exist cases in which "bill and
keep" allows the incumbent to deter entry. Nevertheless, foreclosing the market therefore
requires subsidies that are large enough to make pro￿ts convex (i.e., to ensure ’(m) ￿ 0),
which may be di¢ cult to achieve:
￿ First, ’ may remain positive: starting from m = 0, introducing a small subsidy in-
creases ’, since ’0 (0) = ￿q (c)=2 < 0; while ’0 (m) = (mq0 (c + m) ￿ q (c + m))=2
may become positive for larger subsidies, there is no guarantee that this happens,
and even in that case, there is no guarantee that ’ may become negative for large
enough subsidies.
￿ Second, the size of subsidies may be limited by feasibility considerations; even "bill
and keep" ￿i.e., m = ￿cT ￿may not su¢ ce to generate a large enough subsidy.
￿ Third, very large subsidies and convex pro￿ts may allow the entrant, too, to corner
the market; to avoid this, the incumbent should choose a termination charge satisfy-
ing ￿ (m) < s, which, since ￿0 (m) < 0 for m < 0, imposes an additional restriction
on the size of the subsidy (in particular, this restriction may be incompatible with
’(m) ￿ 0).
26￿ Finally, subsidizing termination may generate abuses and, moreover, o⁄ering lower
prices for o⁄-net calls may not ￿t well with marketing strategies.
Despite these di¢ culties, large subsidies may in some cases allow the incumbent to
corner the market and increase its pro￿t. For example, if ’(m) < 0 for the termination
subsidy such that ￿ (m) = s, then adopting this subsidy (or a slightly lower one) ensures
that I corners the market and obtains a pro￿t equal to s+￿ (m) = 2s, which is twice the
maximal pro￿t that I can obtain by foreclosing the market through a positive termination
mark-up when customer activism bene￿ts the entrant.
Recap
The following proposition summarizes the above discussion:
Proposition 4 Suppose that s < 3t, so that cost-oriented access pricing would allow the
entrant to share the market. While both networks would favour a small reduction in the
access charge over a small increase in the access charge, the incumbent might increase
its pro￿t by departing further away from cost-based access pricing in order to corner the
market; assuming that network externalities are large enough (namely, ￿ > t):
￿ If the incumbent bene￿ts from customer inertia in case of multiple consumer re-
sponses, then it would have an incentive to increase the access charge as much as
possible and could earn in this way up to the monopoly pro￿t.
￿ If instead the entrant bene￿ts from customer activism, then by foreclosing the market
through a positive termination mark-up, the incumbent can earn a pro￿t at most
equal to s, which it can achieve by adopting m = ^ m, such that ￿(m) = 0.
The incumbent may also bene￿t from foreclosing the market through a large enough
termination subsidy, although feasibility, strategic (equilibrium multiplicity) and market-
ing considerations tend to limit this possibility.
27Illustration: linear demand function. Suppose that the utility function takes the
form





with a;b > 0. The demand function is then linear, q(p) = (a ￿ p)=b, while consumer￿ s
surplus is v(p) = (a￿p)2=2b. We adopt the parameter values of De Bijl and Peitz (2002,
2004): a = 20 euro-cents, b = 0:015 euro-cent, cT = 0:5 euro-cent, c = cO + cT = 2
euro-cents, f = 0 and t = 35 euros.31 The feasible range for the termination mark-up is
thus m ￿ ￿cT = ￿0:5 euro-cent and, in this range, it can be checked that ’ and  , as
well as ￿, are all decreasing in m. In particular, condition (5) is satis￿ed for m < ^ m =
3:2014 euro-cent, in which case the second-order condition ’(m) > 0 is also satis￿ed.
In addition, the shared-market condition (14),   (m) > s=3, amounts to m < ￿ m(s),
where ￿ m(s) decreases with s. Therefore, for any s < 3t (so as to ensure that the market
would be shared for m = 0, that is, ￿ m(s) > 0), the market is always shared whenever
access is subsidized (m < 0) or moderately priced (that is, m < minf^ m; ￿ m(s)g); the
incumbent can however corner the market by insisting on a large enough access mark-up
(m > minf^ m; ￿ m(s)g).32 It can moreover be checked that, in the limited admissible range
of negative values for m, the incumbent￿ s (shared-market) equilibrium pro￿t decreases
with m; "bill and keep￿(that is, m = ￿cT = ￿0:5 euro-cent) thus constitutes the most
pro￿table access agreement in this range. Below we compare this pro￿t with the pro￿t
that the incumbent can achieve by cornering the market through large access markups. To
complete the welfare analysis we also study the impact of the access charge on consumer
surplus (CS), net of ￿xed fees and switching and transport costs:







t(1 ￿ x)dx ￿ s￿E:
31In De Bijl and Peitz (2002), t = 60 euros, whereas in De Bijl and Peitz (2004), t = 20 euros. Since
this parameter is di¢ cult to measure, its value is based on experience obtained in the test runs of their
model. Adopting t = 35 euros ensures full participation (v(c) > 3t; see footnote (21)).
32By contrast, E cannot corner the market in the absence of customer activism, since (5) here implies
(14).


































Figure 6: Incumbent￿ s equilibrium pro￿t for small switching costs: s = 5 euros.
For illustrative purposes, we consider two polar cases: i) small switching costs: s = 5
euros; ii) large switching costs: s = 70 euros.
￿ Small switching costs: We have ￿ m(s) = 6:98 > ^ m = 3:2. Therefore, for m < ^ m the
market is shared between the two networks whereas for m ￿ ^ m, there are multiple
consumer responses. In that latter range, I corners the market; if it moreover
bene￿ts from customer inertia, its pro￿t increases with m and, for m large enough,
exceeds the pro￿t achieved when sharing the market under lower access charges.
In case of customer activism, however, I￿ s pro￿t decreases with m, as illustrated
in Figure 6 ￿and E moreover corners the market when m becomes large enough
(namely, when m ￿ 3:72, where ￿ (m) ￿ ￿s). In addition, I￿ s pro￿t from cornering
the market through ^ m, ￿I = s, is lower than in any shared-market equilibrium.
Thus, I would here choose to foreclose the market through large access markups
only when it bene￿ts from customer inertia.
￿ Large switching costs: We now have ￿ m(s) = 2:71 < ^ m = 3:2. Therefore, for m < ￿ m
the two networks share the market, whereas for m between ￿ m and ^ m I corners
the market (even though there is a unique consumer response and pro￿t functions
are concave) by charging FI = f + s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c + m). In this equilibrium, I￿ s
pro￿t increases with m. For m > ^ m, there are multiple consumer responses and I
still corners the market, although its pro￿t increases with m only if it bene￿ts from
customer inertia, as illustrated by Figure 7. I￿ s pro￿t from cornering the market
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Figure 7: Incumbent￿ s equilibrium pro￿t for large switching costs: s = 70 euros.
with m = ^ m is now higher than in any shared-market equilibrium (even with "bill
and keep"), however. Therefore, even in case of customer activism, I will here prefer
to corner the market with a large enough access mark-up (namely, ^ m) rather than
sharing the market with lower or below-cost access charges.
Consumer surplus. In both cases (for small and large switching costs), consumer
surplus increases with m as long as the networks share the market. The reason is that
competition is more aggressive for higher access charges. Also, in both cases, the incum-
bent corners the market when m ￿ ^ m and consumer surplus then decreases (respectively
increases) with m in the presence of customer inertia (activism), since a higher m, re-
duces (increases) the competitive pressure of the entrant. Finally, in the case of large
switching costs, the incumbent also corners the market when m lies between ￿ m and ^ m,
and in this range increasing the access charge reduces the competitive pressure, allows
the incumbent to charge a higher ￿xed fee and thus results in lower consumer surplus.
5 No termination-based price discrimination
So far we have considered the case of termination-based price discrimination. This section,
in contrast, assumes that networks cannot charge di⁄erent prices for on-net and o⁄-net
calls. We will ￿rst examine whether the incumbent can deter entry under the caller-pays
regime. Then, we will explore the case of the receiver-pays regime.
30Caller-pays regime
In this section we examine whether the incumbent can foreclose competition through
access charges when there is no termination-based price discrimination. Network i￿ s
pro￿t is then (for i 6= j = I;E):
￿i = ￿i[(pi ￿ c)q(pi) + Fi ￿ f + ￿jm(q(pj) ￿ q(pi))].
A detailed analysis of shared-market equilibria can be found in Carter and Wright (2003)
and L￿pez (2008). Market shares are given by:
￿I (wI;wE) = 1 ￿ ￿E (wI;wE) =
1
2
+ ￿ (wI ￿ wE ￿ s),
where wi = v (pi) ￿ Fi denotes the net surplus that operator i o⁄ers its customers. We
can interpret network i￿ s strategy as o⁄ering a price pi and a net surplus wi and, given
network j￿ s strategy, network i￿ s best response moreover entails
pi = ~ pi (wi) = c + ~ ￿j (wi)m. (30)
Therefore, given network j￿ s strategy, we can write network i￿ s pro￿t as




i (wi) = ￿ [v (~ pi) ￿ wi ￿ f + (~ ￿j ￿ ~ ￿i)mq (pj) + ~ ￿imq (~ pi)] ￿ ~ ￿i,
~ ￿
00
i (wi) = ￿￿
￿





For m = 0, ~ ￿00
i (wi) = ￿2￿ < 0 and second-order conditions therefore hold; ￿rst-order












31so a shared-market equilibrium exists provided that s < 3t, in which case the incumbent￿ s















We also know from the previous papers that any small departure from m = 0 lowers the
incumbent￿ s pro￿t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which I corners the market. In the light of
the above analysis, it follows that pI = c and pE = c + m. For this to be an equilibrium,
even the consumers closest to E must prefer to stay with I, that is, v(c) ￿ t ￿ FI ￿
v(c + m) ￿ s ￿ FE; and since I maximizes its pro￿t, this inequality cannot be strict,
therefore:
FI = FE ￿ ￿(m) + s. (31)
Moreover, I should not gain from a marginal increase in its fee:
0 ￿ ~ ￿
0
I (wI)j￿I=1 = ￿ [FI ￿ f + m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m))] ￿ 1,
that is:
FI ￿ f + 2t ￿ m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m)). (32)
In addition, E should not make any pro￿t by stealing a few customers, that is:
FE ￿ f + mq(c) ￿ 0. (33)
Using (31), we can rewrite conditions (32) and (33) as:
f ￿ mq(c) ￿ FE ￿ f + 2t + ￿(m) ￿ s ￿ m(q(c) ￿ q(c + m)). (34)
Any FE in the above range can support a cornered-market equilibrium if second-order
conditions are moreover satis￿ed; eliminating weakly dominated strategies singles out the




I(m) = s ￿ ￿(m) ￿ mq(c).
This expression is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to ￿c
I(0) = s ￿ t. Therefore,
when s > 3t, in which case there is no shared-market equilibria and thus I always corners
the market, I￿ s pro￿t is maximal for m = 0 (and the above-described cornered-market
equilibrium indeed exists, since second-order conditions are always satis￿ed for m = 0).
We now show that, when s < 3t, I cannot gain from departing from m = 0 in order to
corner the market. It su¢ ces to show
￿
c





















2 < 0. Since ￿(3t) = 0 and ￿
0(s) > 0 (when
s < 3t), it follows that ￿(s) < 0 for s < 3t.
Consider now a candidate equilibrium in which E corners the market, then pI = c+m
and pE = c. Moreover, the pair of prices (FI;FE) must satisfy
v(c + m) ￿ FI ￿ v(c) ￿ FE ￿ s ￿ t.
In addition, I should not make any pro￿t by attracting a few customers, i.e.,
FI ￿ f ￿ mq(c).
But combining those two conditions yields
￿E = FE ￿ f ￿ v(c) ￿ v(c + m) ￿ mq(c) ￿ s ￿ t,
where the right-hand side is maximal for m = 0, where it is equal to ￿s￿t < 0. Therefore,
in the absence of termination-based price discrimination the entrant cannot corner the
market.
33Receiver-pays regime
In most European countries mobile operators do not charge subscribers for receiving calls
even if it is not explicitly forbidden by NRAs. In contrast, in the United States mobile
network operators usually charge subscribers for the calls they receive. The reason may be
an endogenous price response to the level of the termination charge, i.e., low termination
charges in the U.S. may induce networks to charge their subscribers for receiving calls
so as to recover their cost ￿ indeed Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004), and L￿pez (2011)
show that network operators only ￿nd it pro￿table to charge for incoming calls when the
access charge is below cost. This result is also in line with that of Cambini and Valletti
(2008), who develop a model of information exchange between calling parties.
Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004) and L￿pez (2011)33 show that, when networks compete
in three-part tari⁄s of the form fFi;pi;rig, where ri denotes a per-unit reception charge,
then in equilibrium they charge call origination and call reception at the o⁄-net cost34:
pi = c + m, ri = ￿m.
Moreover, L￿pez (2011) shows that when setting usage prices at the o⁄-net cost, i￿ s pro￿t
writes as ^ ￿i = ￿i(Fi;Fj)[Fi ￿f], which does not depend on m. In other words, m a⁄ects
the usage prices but it does not a⁄ect the competition in ￿xed fees. As a result the
access charge has not impact on the equilibrium pro￿t. Therefore, in the absence of
termination-based price discrimination, networks cannot use access charges to soften or
foreclose competition when they charge for incoming calls.
33L￿pez (2011) generalizes the framework of Jeon, La⁄ont and Tirole (2004) by allowing a random
noise in both the callers￿and receivers￿utilities, by removing the assumption of a given proportionality
between the utility functions and by allowing asymmetry between ￿rms with respect to the installed
market shares.
34L￿pez (2011) show that this equilibrium exists and is unique even if the random noise of the utilities
does not vanish, and thereby receivers can hang up. Cambini and Valletti (2008), and Jeon, La⁄ont and
Tirole (2004), however, consider the case of vanishing noise, where the caller determines the volume of
calls ￿ most of the time￿ .
346 Conclusion
We have studied the impact of reciprocal access charges on entry when consumers face
switching costs, and networks compete in three-part tari⁄s, charging possibly di⁄erent
prices for o⁄-net calls. The analysis shows that when the incumbent bene￿ts from cus-
tomer inertia, it has an incentive to insist on the highest possible (reciprocal) access
mark-up, so as to foreclose the market and exploit fully the resulting monopoly power; a
large termination subsidy could also achieve the same outcome, although subsidies may
in practice be limited by feasibility constraints and moreover trigger various types of
arbitrage.
The scope for foreclosure is more limited if the entrant bene￿ts instead from customer
activism; while the incumbent can still wish to manipulate the termination charge in
order to prevent entry, too high access charges might then allow the entrant to overtake
the incumbent. As a result, optimal foreclosure strategies rely either on limited access
markups or on access subsidies, and are pro￿table only when consumers￿switching costs
are large enough.
Irrespective of whether customers tend to favour the incumbent or the entrant in case
of multiple potential responses to networks￿prices, foreclosure strategies are pro￿table
here only when they result in complete entry deterrence: while the incumbent can in-
crease its market share by insisting on above-cost reciprocal charges, this also results in
more intense price competition and, as a result, both operators￿equilibrium pro￿ts are
lower than when the reciprocal access charges are at or below cost. In other words, lim-
iting entry without deterring it entirely is never pro￿table. This result has clear policy
implications.
Finally, the network e⁄ects created by termination-based price discrimination appear
to be a key ingredient for pro￿table foreclosure strategies. Indeed, in the absence of
on-net pricing, neither the incumbent nor the entrant ￿nd it pro￿table to manipulate
the access charge so as to foreclose competition. In addition, in a receiver-pays regime,
neither operator can use the access charge to foreclose competition.
Further research can extend the analysis in at least two directions. First, in our model
35there is only one incumbent and one entrant. As we usually observe tight oligopolies,
our analysis could be extended to allow for an incumbent (possibly symmetric) oligopoly
￿ghting the arrival of a new entrant. Second, it would be interesting to allow for the arrival
of new customers who are not attached to the incumbent network. In this context, the
incumbent network may ￿nd it pro￿table to set the access charge so as to keep cornering
its customer base while sharing the segment of new consumers.
7 APPENDIX
















For the sake of exposition, we will assume that q (c + m) remains positive; it is easy to
extend to the case q (c + m) ￿ 0.35
It is straightforward to check that, for m > 0, both ’ and   decrease with m. It follows
that E￿ s pro￿t decreases with m when m > 0 (since both ’ and 2￿E = 1 ￿ s=3  (m)
decrease with m).
We now show that I￿ s pro￿t satis￿es ￿I (m) < ￿I (0) for any m > 0. Since ￿I = 1 and


















35For m large enough, q (c + m) may become zero; ￿,  , ’, ￿i and ￿i then remain constant as m




























0 = 2￿I (1 ￿ ￿I) 
0 < 0,
since ￿I 2 (0;1) and  
0 (m) = ￿[q (c + m) ￿ 2mq0 (c + m)]=3 < 0. Therefore,
￿(m) < ￿(0) = ￿I (0).
Similarly, for m < 0 we have   (m) < ’(m) and thus:
￿I(m) > ￿(m).
Since ￿(0) = ￿I (0) and ￿0 (0) = ￿2￿I (0)(1 ￿ ￿I (0))q (c)=3 < 0, ￿I (m) > ￿I (0) for m
slightly negative.
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